Advisory: This article is based in whole or in part on the CFSI (Cleveland Financial Stress Indicator), an indicator that was discontinued by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in 2016 due to the discovery of errors in the indicator's construction. These errors overestimated stress in the real estate and securitization markets. As a result, readers should be cautious and interpret any analysis based on CFSI data with those errors in mind. Timely identification of coincident systemic conditions and forward-looking capacity to anticipate adverse developments are critical for macroprudential policy. Despite clear recognition of these factors in literature, an evaluation methodology and empirical tests for the information value of coincident measures are lacking. This paper provides a twofold contribution to the literature: (i) a general-purpose evaluation framework for assessing information value for measures of systemic conditions, and (ii) an empirical assessment of the information value for several alternative measures of US systemic conditions. We find substantial differences among the measures, of which the Cleveland Financial Stress Index shows best-in-class identification performance. In terms of forecasting performance, Kamakura's Troubled Company Index, Cleveland Financial Stress Index, and Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index show moderately stable usefulness metrics over time.
Introduction
The complex and adaptive nature of financial systems imposes challenges to prudential supervision demanding a more holistic and flexible policy. 1 In addition to the regulation of individual institutions through microprudential supervision, a macroprudential focus on systemwide risks is essential. In the vein of Borio (2003), a macroprudential approach is concerned with the analysis of systemic risk along the cyclical and structural dimensions, where the former relates to the build-up of widespread imbalances and subsequent unraveling in times of crisis and the latter to the distribution of risks and shocks' transmission across the system. Adaptive supervision of systemic risk must be sensitive to potentially rapid transformations of the financial sector, as is indicated in Fig. 1 . Suggestions for increased dynamic macroprudential policy have been made, for example, by the Bank of England (BoE, 2011) and the IMF (Lim et al., 2011) . In line with more adjustable and granular regulation in Basel III, adaptive macroprudential policy contributes distinct conceptual and practical enhancements to the prudential toolbox. This paper supports adaptive policies by providing a structured approach to evaluate the information value for measures of systemic conditions.
Insert The fundamental objective of macroprudential policy is to limit the probability and severity of systemic failure, i.e. limit systemic risk. Its strategies are often oriented to the institution-specific limits and targets that depend on the risk profile of the system and the contribution to that profile of each institution. The limits mainly address institutional risk, return, and liquidity in the context of submarkets and the overall system (Aikman et al., 2013) . For example, time-varying targets can include countercyclical buffers, time-varying provisioning, and time-varying reserve requirements (Frait and Komárková, 2011) . Generally, in the vein of Minskian boom-bust cycles (Minsky, 1982) , macroprudential policies of disclosure and targets in the cyclical dimension attempt to "create built-in mechanisms that attenuate the impact of procyclical behavior" (Cukierman, 2011) . In the structural dimension, macroprudential policy controls the buildup of large systemic imbalances (common exposures) and increases the resilience of networks by attenuating risk propagation. Common exposures and connectivity among institutions arise particularly through contractual obligations (ECB, 2013; Flood et al., 2013) . It is worth noting that macroprudential tools require forecasts of systemic stress to provide time for preparing and implementing policies (Kellermann and Mosch, 2013) , as risks 1 The concept of the economy as an adaptive, complex system was pioneered by Holland (1975 Holland ( , 1988 in his work on adaptive nonlinear networks. Hommes (1997, 1998) study financial markets as adaptive belief systems. Hommes (2001) extends this approach to markets as nonlinear adaptive evolutionary systems. See Arthur (1995) and Farmer and Lo (1999) for an analysis of heterogeneity in financial markets, Hollingsworth et al. (2005) for the socio-economic implications of a financial system's complexity, and Judge (2012) for the increasing complexity caused by the fragmentation of financial markets. must be mitigated before they reach tipping points (ECB 2013) . These considerations point to the variety of information needed to support macroprudential policy.
Beyond information requirements, the complexity and dynamics of modern financial systems further highlight challenges in accessing appropriate and timely measures of the system's structure and its transformation (Alampalli, 2013; Flood et al., 2013) . To this end, Andersson et al. (2013) assert that "good supervision is analytical, holistic and forward-looking." Multiple measures have recently been developed to assess and analyze system-wide risks in the macro-financial environment. These include alternative measures of systemic conditions to identify the cyclical dimension continually, as well as institutional and macroeconomic early warning indicators of exuberance, excessive changes and misalignments.
2 Institutional early warning indicators are grounded in capacities to lead the recognition of institutional imbalances and result in a structural framework for monitoring the buildup of macroeconomic stresses (Oet et al., 2013) . Macroeconomic early warning indicators are grounded in capacities to lead the recognition of systemic crises and germinate a common cyclical framework for evaluating policymaker's loss function (Alessi and Detken, 2011; Sarlin, 2013 ). Yet, little or no work has focused on the comparative information quality of the coincident measures of systemic conditions. To this end, we put forward and apply a methodology to assess the quality of information provided by these measures. Determining the information value for the coincident measures of systemic conditions is critical for several reasons. First, the systemic risk literature has provided a wide array of alternative approaches to gauge systemic conditions. However, there is no agreement on one measurement approach above others. Second, the existence of an evaluation framework is essential for these measures as, in contrast to macroeconomic early warning indicators, they are not calibrated to rare crises. Finally, the framework to assess comparatively the measures' information value forms the basis for monitoring and forecasting financial instability at several horizons.
The first part of this paper provides a general-purpose evaluation framework for assessing the information value for measures of systemic conditions (Section 2). The framework relies on previous work in the early warning literature and extends it by provision of new performance measures. The following part applies the framework in an empirical assessment of the information value of several coincident measures for the US (Section 3 and 4). We explore the relative performance of a large palette of measures both in terms of coincident signaling quality and early warning performance. This analysis is completed at multiple frequencies to verify the robustness of signaling. Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion of the applications of this study.
A framework for evaluating coincident measures of systemic conditions
This section presents the framework that is used to evaluate coincident systemic condition measures. The methodology includes performance tests for a standard two-class classification task as well as time-series methods for forecasting.
A contingency matrix and crisis signals
An immediate concern to policymakers is the issue of whether and when to implement macroprudential policy. Policymakers possess a set of instruments through which they can affect the financial system in case of crisis. However, these policies are costly to implement when there is no crisis. When a crisis occurs, policy is either implemented to the benefit of the system (true positive, TP) or not implemented with detrimental effect (false negative, FN). If a crisis does not occur, policymakers can implement an unnecessary and potentially burdensome policy (false positive, FP) or efficiently abstain from implementing policy (true negative, TN). As pointed out in Sarlin (2013) , and following the notation of Elkan (2001) , we map each of the alternatives to costs c, for which we assume that the costs and are non-negative while and are non-positive costs. 3 The cost of not implementing policy in times of crisis is 1 = − , and the cost of implementing policy when there is no crisis is 2 = − which rolls all costs into two terms. Additionally, we denote by 1 = + + + + the unconditional probability that there is a crisis and 2 = 1 − 1 the unconditional probability that no crisis will occur. 4 Insert Table 1 about here  Table 1 Policymaker's cost matrix.
Evaluating identification properties for systemic condition measures
To evaluate the performance of systemic condition measures, we need to go beyond comparative classification quality obtained through the contingency matrix approach of Table 1 and consider the value of these measures to support policymakers' decisions continually. To this end we develop a general-purpose evaluation framework for assessing the coincident measures' information quality.
We begin by noting that the above contingency matrix requires two time series: an ideal indicator , that accurately encodes the occurrence and absence of crisis events (or pre-crisis events) and a predictor , , that attempts to measure when a crisis (or pre-crisis) is occurring based upon which policymakers make their decisions. Therefore, evaluation metrics are essential for finding the optimal threshold , for predictor to generate , , . Next, we recognize that 3 Note that these costs are constant since we are considering the somewhat restrictive case where policymakers control the decision to implement policy but may not vary the magnitude of policy. This restriction allows us to deal with the two-class classification problem. 4 The unconditional probabilities 1 and 2 are independent of the stress measure i used by policymakers to decide whether or not to implement policy. information content of the coincident measures is relevant to policymakers' decisions from dual perspective of the level of financial system conditions and of the change in these conditions since last observation. Thus, the evaluation framework is applied with two perspectives ∈ { , } using several analysis frequencies and multiple stress measures . The above observations result in a more granular view of the information quality of the coincident measures. To this end we quantify the measures' Noise to Signal Ratio (NTSR), Information Value (IV), absolute Usefulness ( ), and relative Usefulness ( ).
The noise to signal ratio is defined as = 2
(1− 1 )
. In our case, Type I error indicates the proportion of crisis observations which are falsely classified as non-crisis ( 1 = ( + ) = ( , = 0| = 1)), whereas Type II error refers to the proportion of non-crisis periods where a crisis was mistakenly signaled ( 2 = + = ( , = 1| = 0)). A noise to signal ratio lower than one indicates the measure is beneficial, and Kaminsky et al. (1998) select the thresholds for each indicator in their study ( , , and , ) to minimize NTSR. Unfortunately, since there are typically far more observations classified as "non-crisis" than "crisis" the NTSR can often be reduced to zero by setting the threshold for a stress measure conservatively high so that is zero while maintaining greater than zero. The IV has been proposed when choosing between several regressors (see Siddiqi, 2006; Hababou et al., 2006; Lin, 2013) . To calculate this measure we first determine whether the signal generated by our regressor was the same as that of the ideal indicator. Next we sort our data set by the regressor and group it into bins delimited by the − 1 quantiles of series i, allowing us to define
where good j (resp. bad j ) is the fraction of all good (bad) predictions located in bin j. Notice that if the regressor contains no relevant information we would expect to see the same proportion of good and bad predictions in each bin leading to an information value of zero. Due to the definition's use of the natural logarithm, the absolute value of may become very large if or become close to zero making it a somewhat unstable metric when working with a short dataset. We select the number of bins in order to minimize the number of measures for which the IV becomes undefined. Siddiqi (2006) provides a heuristic guide whereby an IV of less than 0.1 is weak, IV from 0.1 to 0.3 is average, IV from 0.3 to 0.5 is strong, while IV greater than 0.5 may be suspiciously high.
Selecting the thresholds , and , based on the NTSR may lead to higher thresholds that tend to eliminate Type II error at the expense of Type I error. Unlike the NTSR, IV deviates from values near 0.5 (which we consider to be an optimal score); excessive Type I or Type II errors are penalized leading to an optimal threshold which is potentially less biased.
5 Thus, the thresholds , and , are selected for each data series to minimize the deviation of IV from 0.5 allowing an unbiased comparison of measures which are individually signaling at their best. For ∈ { , } we find , such that:
However, the IV and NTSR metrics do not consider the cost of Type I and Type II errors which clearly offers an opportunity to improve the evaluation framework. We attempt therefore to measure the monetary value of information provided by a stress measure which accounts for the costs of policy implementation and the unconditional probability of crisis. The policymaker is faced with the two-class problem from decision theory. Traditional metrics when handling this class of problems include the Expected Value Under Uncertainty (EVUU), the Expected Value of Perfect Prediction (EVPP), and the Expected Value of Perfect Information given by: 
Then is equal to minus which does not simplify conveniently. If we assume that the policies and their effectiveness are fixed and exogenous, then there are too many parameters to intuitively consider EVSI when evaluating crisis measures. However, if we were able to estimate , , , and , then the formula for EVSI would simplify dramatically leaving us only with the choice of thresholds. As a straightforward implementation of decision theory which accounts for the costs of FN compared to FP and their probabilities, EVSI can efficiently differentiate between alternative stress measures.
In the absence of specific information about the potential costs and benefits of implementing policy, Sarlin (2013) defines the absolute and relative Usefulness of predictor i according to:
5
The relationship of the signaling threshold to the NTSR and IV metrics is somewhat erratic and while the tendencies outlined above hold true for the majority of this paper's empirical analysis, they are not guaranteed to hold for alternative datasets.
( ) = 1 1 + (1 − ) 2 2 (9), where ( ) represents the policymaker's loss function. Note that the first term in equation (7) is proportional to the expected value of perfect information. This construction then works on the idea that superior predictors allow policymakers to minimize ( ) in which case ( ) will approach 1 ( 1 + 2 )
. Also note that by selecting the signaling thresholds , and , to optimize ( ) for varying we do not determine which predictors are most valuable depending on policymakers risk preference . Instead we determine which predictors have value for differing relative cost of Type I error versus Type II error, while assuming that the policy maker is risk neutral. 6 As an alternative to the method described in equation (2) ( ) (10).
Evaluating early warning properties for coincident systemic measures
Several authors employ parts of the above methodology to determine whether individual measures consistently lead the benchmark as predictors of crisis, allowing time for policy to be implemented (see Kaminsky et al., 1998; Edison, 2003; Lo Duca and Peltonen, 2013) . Most of these focus on the identification of periods in a predefined window prior to crisis events. By contrast, the measures under consideration in this study are designed to assess contemporaneous systemic conditions. While good coincident measures can provide useful information for the purpose of disclosure, limits, and targets of macroprudential policies, they may provide policymakers insufficient time to deploy slower policy instruments. Therefore, beyond testing the power of these measures to identify contemporaneous conditions, it is important to determine whether they possess a structure which is conducive to an early warning of adverse systemic developments. Namely, using only a collection of coincident measures, would a supervisor be capable of producing accurate near-term forecasts of systemic conditions? Naturally, any coincident measures that possess the relevant structure have enhanced quality to policymakers for the conduct of macroprudential policy. Therefore, the second aspect of the proposed 6 It is interesting to note that when defining the policymaker's loss function, has been called the "relative preference of policymakers between FNs and FPs" (Lo Duca and Peltonen, 2013) , the "policy maker's relative risk aversion between type I and type II errors" (Alessi and Detken, 2011) , and "the decision-maker's degree of risk-aversion towards missing a crisis" (Fuertes and Kalotychou, 2007) . Each of these terminologies seem to imply that this parameter captures the risk aversion of the policy maker's utility function. However, is only a measure of relative cost and relies on the assumption that the policy maker is inherently risk neutral. To account for the risk aversion of policymakers we could replace , , , and by , , , and where = ( | ) for all ∈ { , , , } and ( | ) is a utility function appropriate for policymakers with risk aversion . evaluation framework considers the cyclical properties of coincident measures investigated by means of time series analysis.
We begin with an exploration of the autoregressive properties of individual stress measures using the Box-Jenkins (1970) methodology. For each stress measure we test several variations of the ARIMA(p,d,q) model, given by equation (11). We also test for the presence of heteroskedasticity, and where appropriate we implement the GARCH(p,q) methodology to account for this aspect of the data. The final model is selected based on properties of the residuals (stationarity, heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and partial autocorrelation), the Akaike information criterion (AIC), and the Schwarz criterion (SC). We define the difference operator Δ such that Δ = −1 is the time series differenced times and consider , , and constants:
We are also interested in the question of whether the stress measures collectively provide beneficial insight into the development of stress. We apply the Johansen (1995) method to test the properties of our data and select a VAR or VEC model following equations (12) or (13) respectively. We attempt to discern whether the assorted perspectives of financial system conditions provided by individual measures allow insight into a mechanism for the development of critical systemic episodes.
. Applying this methodology to a collection of coincident measures , , where = 1, … , , we define as the × 1 vector of coincident measures, c is an × 1 constant vector, and , , , and are × matrices where is the number of lags considered for each stress measure. The number of lagged terms to incorporate is determined through consideration of the AIC, and the SC.
Data for empirical assessment
In this section, we describe the dataset used in the empirical assessment of the information value for alternative measures of US systemic conditions. We describe two types of data: first, a constructed representation , of the ideal indicator, and second, the set of coincident measures.
A benchmark index of financial stress
To evaluate coincident measures, we need to ground the comparison to truth. The contingency matrix shown in Table 1 requires not only a predictor , , that attempts to measure when a crisis occurs, but also an ideal indicator of truth , that accurately encodes the occurrence and absence of crisis events. Unfortunately, one single, widely accepted "true" series for the occurrence of financial crises does not exist. When determining a crisis benchmark, the 7 The results are available from the authors upon request. literature has used two approaches to define events: information on direct distress in the system and government interventions, and thresholds on market-based stress indexes. An example of the former type of events is the database of currency, debt and banking crises by Laeven and Valencia (2013) , whereas Kaminsky et al. (1998) and Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013) are two examples of market-based indexes. Kaminsky et al. (1998) define currency crises to occur when their market-pressure index exceeds its mean with more than three standard deviations. Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013) identify systemic events when their financial stress index is above the 90 th country-specific percentile.
In contrast to these studies we proxy the ideal indicator by a composite benchmark to reflect the US diverse financial system and to capture a multi-dimensional crisis. 8 To this end, the benchmark design proxies the ideal indicator by sensitizing our construction to three behavioral characteristics of actual crises: severity of the system's state, persistence over time, and pervasiveness across components of the system. Accordingly, the benchmark is calculated using six volatility series to broadly capture critical disturbances in the US markets for equity (through the Chicago Board Options Exchange VIX), foreign exchange (through JPMorgan Chase JPMVXYGL), interbank (through Merrill Lynch's MOVE), credit (through MLCORVOL), securitization (through SECURX), and real estate (through REALX) 9 markets.
We use the following systematic approach to assessing threshold exceedances. Under the ∈ { } perspective, the benchmark is defined to indicate crisis if the imbalance level of a volatility series is above threshold , in two consecutive periods or if the imbalance levels of two volatility series are above , simultaneously. The alternative ∈ { } perspective generates a signal if the difference in the imbalance of a volatility series is above a threshold , in two consecutive periods or if the differences in the imbalances of two volatility series are above , simultaneously. Formally, we define the imbalance and indicator functions as:
,
, and,
By monitoring the imbalance in volatility, the level perspective will produce signals throughout the crisis if a single market indicator demonstrates persistently high levels (two or more consecutive alerts) or if multiple markets are above the threshold simultaneously. In addition, monitoring the differences in volatility imbalances will focus on potential developing crises with alerts stemming from notable persistent growth in imbalances for at least one market or the simultaneous growth of imbalances in at least two markets. However, by design the difference methodology will produce signals only at the onset of a crisis and will not allow us to determine crisis termination. In summary, construction of the benchmark series , proxies the ideal indicator of truth by capturing a multi-dimensional set of crisis characteristics: severity (through , and , ), persistence ( = 2 periods), and pervasiveness ( = 2 markets).
The benchmark thresholds , and , used in equations (14)- (18) are selected such that approximately 20% of observations indicate crisis.
10 Alternatives using multivariate logistic regression could also be used under similar considerations. Clearly, the benchmark design described above will not perfectly indicate the presence and absence of system-wide crisis; however, the degree to which several distinct characteristics align proxies the ideal indicator both experientially (by describing relevant critical systemic episodes) and metrically (by supporting the benchmark's convergent validity). The benchmark is compared to several published coincident measures in Fig. 2 under both ∈ { , } perspectives.
Insert 
Systemic financial stress measures
Our dataset includes 23 published measures of contemporaneous US financial conditions, stress, risk, and system structure (not all measures are available for comparison at every frequency). To make use of the contingency matrix for evaluating coincident measures, we must also determine when each measure indicates that policy should be implemented, that is when they signal a crisis. Therefore, we propose a scheme parallel to that developed for the benchmark. Each measure is converted to an imbalance by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation.
11 Crisis signals are then generated for each series where crisis is indicated if the imbalance (or the differenced imbalance) is greater than the threshold , (respectively , ), specifically:
.
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2 . The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO MSA) was also calculated to determine whether these series would be conducive to factor analysis following equation (21) where 2 the correlations and 2 are the partial correlations between j and k. According to Kaiser (1970) a MSA above 0.8 is very good, between 0.6 and 0.8 is middling, and below 0.6 is poor. The KMO MSA for the specified variables (excluding the components of CFSI to eliminate multicollinearity) was computed as 0.842 indicating very good cohesion of the concepts captured by these measures (significant at 1%):
Insert Table 2 about here  Table 2 Descriptive statistics.
The coincident measures considered in this paper focus on several aspects of financial system health. The first group of measures focuses on the concept of systemic stress which can be defined as relative pressure in the financial system. These indexes-Bloomberg Financial Conditions Index (FCI), Goldman Sachs FCI, Cleveland Fed Financial Stress Index (CFSI), Kansas City Fed Financial Stress Index (KCFSI), St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index (STLFSI) and Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI)-typically incorporate variables describing core markets and functions of the financial system which are then aggregated using a variety of weighting methodologies. For instance, the CFSI measures systemic stress as the credit weighted aggregate of stress in six markets (see Fig. 2 ). Systemic conditions in these markets are assessed on the basis of spreads, normalized using the relative rank, and are aggregated using credit weights as a dynamic weighting method (stress adjusts to variations in importance of each measure and market to the financial system). Alternately, the Bloomberg FCI looks at normalized spreads, equity prices, and equity volatility (VIX) using constant weights to determine a measure of the access to credit. Because systemic stress often evolves from individual sub-sectors and their correlated behavior, information about the state of stress in the systems' components and their comovement is particularly useful.
A second group of measures examines the state of gross economic activity-Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) and Philadelphia's Leading Index-using transformations of a large set of variables. CFNAI looks at several aspects of the economy including personal consumption and housing, employment/unemployment and hours, production and income, sales/orders and inventories. The third category of coincident measures included in this study-SRISK and Kamakura's Troubled Company Index-reflects the concepts of current expectations of systemic risk which are forward-looking by design. For instance, SRISK calculates the expected decrease in bank capital under a given set of adverse conditions at the institution level. The resulting knowledge about the factors of stress permits much more detail in macroprudential communication and also assists when guiding institutions' risk management functions.
We analyze the dataset in two samples. The first (main) sample maximizes the available breadth of the sample, while the second (robustness) sample seeks to maximize its length. Accordingly the main sample (June 2000  December 2013) consists of 23 quarterly, 23 monthly, 14 weekly, and 10 daily series. The robustness sample (May 1992  December 2013) consists of 21 quarterly, 21 monthly, 12 weekly, and 9 daily series and encompasses at least two full economic cycles (following the NBER delineation of recession periods), 12 including several well-recognized critical episodes. It has to be agreed that a longer time series provides more insight into the cyclical properties of the observed measures. However, the longer sample also limits the cross-sectional analysis, as not all indicators are available for a longer period. Our sampling strategy balances the trade-off between the number of indicators and the number of observations, emphasizing cross-sectional comparisons in the main sample and cyclical comparisons in the robustness sample. Importantly, at quarterly and monthly frequencies, the composition of both samples includes all three groups of coincident measures.
Results
This section presents evaluation results from the empirical assessment of alternative US coincident measures in the main sample. The section consists of two parts: the first part tests the coincident efficacy for measures of systemic conditions and the second part tests the early warning effectiveness of the measures. The results of testing the robustness sample are presented in Tables A.1-A.4 in the Appendix. As shown, the robustness sample results are generally consistent with main findings.
Efficacy of systemic condition measures
Tables 3 and 4 report the comparative signaling results for the tested coincident measures where thresholds , and , are selected to optimize the information value metric IV following equation (2). As these tables should display measures with comparable IV metrics by design, we will evaluate the comparative advantage of these measures in terms of the Type I (T1) error rate, Type II (T2) error rate, NTSR, and Usefulness metrics. Table 3 displays comparative metrics when signals of crisis are based upon the level of imbalances in the volatility and stress time series. Almost every measure of stress produces a NTSR below unity at every frequency indicating varying degrees of benefit from their use.
Additionally, the usefulness of most series (captured by ( )) is maximized when the relative cost of Type I versus Type II error to risk neutral policymakers is given by = 0.7, that is, Type I error is more costly than Type II error. This is advantageous since it indicates that the measures included in this study are in large part conducive to policymaker's needs. Typically it is assumed that the cost of not implementing policy in the case of crisis outstrips the cost of implementing policy in the case of no crisis. This is also in line with previous findings on relative costs between errors (Sarlin, 2013; Betz et al., 2014) . These results indicate that the 6 sector CFSI, the Goldman Sachs FCI, and STLFSI consistently produce the highest Usefulness metrics and very low NTSRs. The CFSI produces a lower Type I error rate than the Goldman Sachs FCI at the cost of a slight increase in the Type II error rate. SRISK and Philadelphia's Leading Index also demonstrate fairly steady and attractive metrics. Although the Usefulness and NTSR for KCFSI, NFCI, and CFNAI 3-month moving average are attractive (particularly at monthly frequency), they exhibit excessively high (or low) IV. Additionally, it is interesting to note that CFSI and CFNAI, for which the components are also available, modestly outperform their components. This is a welcome observation, as it provides additional support for their composite methodologies and is consistent with the financial system's property of hierarchical composition and decomposability (Simon, 1962) .
Insert Table 3 about here  Table 3 IV based results.
When we analyze the differenced imbalances in an effort to focus on the onset of crises instead of their duration, Table 4 indicates substantially different results in terms of the comparative advantage of each measure. STLFSI, NFCI, Bloomberg FCI, SRISK, and CFSI each demonstrate attractive NTSR and Usefulness metrics at assorted frequencies, however there is no clear leader.
Insert Table 4 about here  Table 4 IV based results.
If we determine , based upon maximization of the Usefulness following equation (10), we can note based upon Tables 5 and 6 that the NTSR is quite low, and more interestingly there appears to be a fairly clear divide between measures with strong IV metrics and those with weak IV metrics. The clear leaders using this methodology in Table 5 are CFSI and STLFSI, which consistently achieve high Usefulness metrics and low NTSR. At monthly and weekly frequency both produce strong IV, but at quarterly frequency STLFSI has a middling Usefulness and the IV is undefined. Philadelphia's Leading Index, NFCI, Goldman Sachs FCI, and Bloomberg FCI also have attractive IV and NTSR. However, they produce somewhat lower Usefulness metrics due to their balance of Type I and Type II errors.
Insert Table 5 about here  Table 5 Usefulness based results.
Interestingly, determining , based upon equation (10) produces a collection of measures with little stability across frequencies, as is shown in Table 6 . At quarterly frequency many measures (Bloomberg FCI, Goldman Sachs FCI, CFSI, and the CFNAI) possess attractive Usefulness measures and good NTSR, albeit accompanied by somewhat large variation in IVs. STLFSI, NFCI, and the CFNAI diffusion index do achieve a good balance of all three metrics. At other frequencies Goldman Sachs FCI, KCFSI, SRISK, and CFSI produce attractive Usefulness metrics with acceptable NTSR, but the IV results tend to diverge from the desired 0.4-0.6 range. Bloomberg FCI achieves good metrics at every frequency hindered only with high (low) IV at quarterly (weekly) frequencies.
13
Insert Table 6 about here  Table 6 Usefulness based results.
Early warning effectiveness of coincident systemic measures
The set of experiments herein focus on early warning properties of the US coincident systemic measures. To apply the Box-Jenkins methodology, we begin by differencing the standardized coincident measures to achieve weak form stationarity. Once this is achieved we often find that based upon autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation evidence there is no support for an autoregressive or moving average structure in the data. These results appear to support the idea that systemic conditions, as viewed by these measures individually, display characteristics of random walk over the period 2002M01 to 2007M06, and thus we omit the estimation results.
We also pursue an atheoretical examination of the potential for a process through which financial conditions perceived by a collection of measures may develop into stress observed by another set of measures. The cointegrated VEC forecasts are presented visually in Figure 3 using an initial estimation sample from 1992M05 to 2004M01. The forecast is effected by estimating 13 When generating the benchmark, each volatility series is converted into an imbalance which adjusts the location and scale parameters of its distribution but will not remedy skewness or kurtosis differences between volatility indices. As a result, if the distribution for the VIX time-series data exhibits fat tails compared to the other volatility benchmarks it may generate a disproportionate number of signals compared to the other volatility indices. This may explain why stress measures that include VIX demonstrate a modestly improved ability to locate observations of crisis.
the parameters using all observable data and calculating the forecast one period ahead repeatedly between 2004M02 and 2013M12.
Insert A comparison of the forecast accuracy from out-of-sample forecasts is available in Table  7 , sorted by mean absolute percentage error (MAPE). Here NFCI provides the best absolute outof-sample fit, while Bloomberg FCI exhibits the worst fit. From these forecasts we generate signals of crisis (using thresholds for each measure which maximize the in-sample Usefulness metric) to see if there is a significant difference between in-sample and out-of-sample Usefulness (Table 8 ). The estimation and forecasting samples were selected to provide sufficient data for lagged regression; so that the forecast timeframe would include observations where the benchmark generated signals of both crisis and no crisis (allowing forecasts to produce both Type I and Type II errors).
Insert Table 7 about here  Table 7 Forecast accuracy.
The Usefulness metric used to evaluate the forecasts is sensitive to the chosen in-sample and out-of-sample intervals, since without the opportunity to compare a forecast against both crisis and tranquil observations the Usefulness metric will have a maximum of zero. By definition, forecasts with a uniform prediction of crisis or no crisis have a maximum Usefulness of zero. We find the Usefulness, IV, and NTSR do no exhibit a great deal of persistence between in-sample and out-of-sample results. Interestingly, KCFSI and NFCI perform much better out-ofsample than in-sample, while Bloomberg FCI, CFNAI, and the Philadelphia's Leading Index all perform worse out-of-sample. Only three of the tested measures: Kamakura's Troubled Company Index, CFSI, and Goldman Sachs FCI demonstrate modestly stable Usefulness metrics over time.
Insert Table 8 about here  Table 8 Usefulness of in sample data compared to out of sample forecasts.
Conclusion
To be conducive to macroprudential policy in adaptive financial markets, coincident measures must support the identification, analysis and early warning of systemic risk conditions. They must reveal in timely manner information concerning the aggregation of exposures from individual firms or markets to the system level. Thus, the ability of decomposable coincident measures to reflect the hierarchical composition of the system (Simon, 1962) is inherently useful for understanding the system and its critical modes. Decomposable coincident measures tend to have enhanced information value by reflecting conditions in a variety of aspects of the financial system. Further, coincident measures must be constructed with the ability to remain informative across time despite changes in the financial system, so that they can be used to analyze past trends, monitor the financial system, and serve as dependent variables in studies of financial instability.
This paper analyzes several metrics used to compare coincident measures of systemic conditions to a benchmark representing the presence of crisis, alongside the methodology used to generate signals. Concerning the choice between signaling the presence or absence of a crisis on the basis of the level of imbalances as opposed to the growth in imbalances, we note that defining thresholds in terms of imbalance levels advantageously produces much more stable information value, NTSR, and Usefulness metrics across frequencies. Analyzing the level of systemic conditions also allows a direct study of the beginning and end of each episode, an objective not attained by the difference perspective. With respect to the particular metrics used to compare coincident measures and determine thresholds we find that the Usefulness metric possesses several suitable properties. The Usefulness metric has a straightforward scale for which higher Usefulness is better (superior to the heuristic scale of IV), is stable across all selections of ∈ (0,1) (unlike the stability of IV which depends on the number of bins or NTSR which depends on the particular balance of Type I and Type II error rates), and it incorporates the necessary and intuitive aspect of policy cost versus benefit represented by the preference parameter . Usefulness should not be considered by itself, but it remains a convenient and accessible metric to use for introductory comparison. The balance between Type I and Type II error rates captured by the NTSR, the dispersion of good versus bad predictions in each quantile, and the raw Type I and Type II error rates each display distinct and beneficial insight into the quality of information provided by coincident measures. Empirical evaluation utilizing the imbalance level perspective and selecting thresholds that maximize the Usefulness metric (presented in Table 5 ) reveals that several measures exhibit consistently attractive properties, with CFSI leading across all analysis frequencies.
Policymakers rely on the ability to project systemic conditions to enable implementation of policies which take time to affect the financial system. Our analysis of US coincident measures using the Box-Jenkins ARIMA methodology indicates that they do not (after necessary transformation) possess sufficient structure individually. As an alternative, the VEC methodology is used with mixed results on a longer sample to determine whether there is a process through which observations of systemic conditions allow insight into a mechanism for the development of critical systemic episodes. On one hand, the results show significant cointegration which indicates that there are long run relationships between several of the coincident measures. In addition, some of the forecasts exhibit moderately stable positive Usefulness out-of-sample, which is attractive to policymakers. On the other hand, the one period forecasts radically limit the application for policy implementation. This is a topic that requires further study using methods capable of producing robust, dynamic, and actionable forecasts.
A basic problem in identifying and analyzing systemic risk is that it may arise from patterns "for which we have no precedent" (Judge 2012). This is particularly relevant for adaptive markets. Alternatively, assessing systemic risk on the basis of a policymaker's own considerations and scenarios may lead to unrealistic assumptions. A particular challenge in applying early warning projections for macroprudential policy is that the policy itself leads to feedbacks and adverse or unanticipated dynamics. This further amplification of the system's adaptive response to macroprudential policy must be considered a major challenge of the policy itself. A further question, therefore, is to what extent policy should restrict itself to ex-post responses to the transformation of markets or direct itself ex-ante to control the sensitivity of the system's adaptation. Table 4 Comparison of financial stress indices' ability to signal stress based on the differenced imbalance and optimal IV. Table 6 Comparison of financial stress indices' ability to signal stress based on the differenced imbalance and maximization of Usefulness. 
